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Abstract—Internet is a large-scale and highly competitive
economic ecosystem. In order to make fair decisions, while
preventing the economic actors from manipulating the natural
outcome of the decision process, game theory is a natural frame-
work, and voting systems represent an interesting alternative
that, to our knowledge, has not yet being considered. They
allow competing entities to decide among different options. In
this paper, we investigate their use for end-to-end path selection
in multi-operator networks, analyzing their manipulability by
tactical voting and their economic efficiency. We show that Instant
Runoff Voting is much more efficient and resistant to tactical
voting than the natural system which tries to get the economic
optimum.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of new services, along with the constant
growth of existing ones, has led to the explosion of Internet
traffic. The network of networks has become a huge economic
ecosystem, on which lot of companies are making revenues.
This includes network operators, that interconnect their infras-
tructures to make the Internet, but also service providers, that
monetize their services on it. In this context, it is important
to ensure fairness in decisions that involve many competing
actors, with the goal to reach some kind of global economic
optimum.
Indeed, participants of a decentralized network often have
to make global decisions based on local interests. For instance,
Internet routes span over multiple Autonomous Systems, while
they result from local, arbitrary decisions. Many fields re-
lated to game theory have been proposed in order to have
a better understanding of distributed decision-related issues
([1]). However, to the best of our knowledge, one of these
fields remain mostly unexploited: voting systems, that allow
competing entities to decide among different options.
The main goal of this paper is to investigate the usage of
voting systems within the Internet economic ecosystem on
a given use-case. In particular, we focus on the question of
manipulability (i.e., vulnerability to tactical voting), which
is crucial in a decision-making context: How hard is it for
participants to change the decision by lying about their own
interests? It is known that except for a few degenerated
cases, all voting systems can be cheated ([2], [3]). However,
the practical performance of existing algorithms is mostly
limited to high level properties. This study applies the voting
system framework to a networking use-case, and quantifies
manipulability and its effects on such a scenario. This paper
is organized as follows. Section II gives a generic, self-
contained, framework of voting systems, with a focus on
manipulability aspects. Section III defines and models the
networking use-case of our paper: path establishment in multi-
operator networks. Lastly, in Section IV, we analyze the results
we obtain, illustrating how and why voting systems can be
very interesting for practical use in an economic ecosystem
such as the one of multi-operator networks.
II. GENERALITIES ON VOTING SYSTEMS
This section presents the general framework of voting
systems that we use in this study. It first describes the notion of
elector’s preferences, the general definition of voting systems
and some examples that we use in our study. Manipulability
criteria are then given, as well as some general results that are
known about manipulability of voting systems.
A. Preferences
We note E = {ei}ni=1 the set of electors and C = {cj}mj=1
the set of candidates. Following Von Neumann-Morgenstern
approach [4], the preferences of an elector ei are represented
by a utility vector Ui = (ui,j)mj=1, with:
• ui,j > ui,k means that ei strictly prefers cj to ck,
• ui,j = ui,k means that ei equally values cj and ck,
• For λ ∈ [0, 1], ui,k > λui,j + (1 − λ)ui,l means that ei
strictly prefers ck to a lottery where cj is chosen with
probability λ and cl with probability 1− λ.
Thus, Ui does not only represent elector ei’s order of prefer-
ences but also the compared strengths of her preferences.
We note U = Rm the space of the possible preference
profiles for an elector. Knowing elector ei’s utility vector
Ui ∈ U , we can deduct ei’s order of preferences with the
canonical surjection σ from the utility space U to the set of
weak orders over the candidates.
B. Voting system definition
A voting system allows competing entities (the electors) to
select one option among several ones (the candidates). An
elector ei can choose a deterministic strategy, also called
ballot, from a strategy set Si. This would be called a pure
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a strategy, the voting system picks out a candidate, applying
a voting rule function f : S1× . . .×Sn → C. In order to link
utilities to voting systems, we also need to define sincerity. For
each i, we assume that there is a function gi : U → Si that
describes the “spirit” of the voting system: If your preferences
are Ui, you are supposed to vote gi(Ui) and doing so will
be considered sincere. Actually, most voting systems admit a
simple, canonical, sincerity function:
• When Si is equal to U , we use gi = Id;
• When Si is the set of weak orders over the candidates,
we use gi = σ, the canonical surjection.
Note that a great part of the literature limits voting systems
to the case where Si is limited to the set of strict orders over
the candidates [3], [5], [6], [7], [8].
C. Examples of voting systems
Voting systems are a huge family, and studying all of them
is far beyond the scope of this paper. For reasons that will be
detailed in Section III, we focus on the following systems:
1) Range Voting (RV): Each elector ei communicates a
vector of marks, Si = (si,j)mj=1. The candidates cj who
maximizes
∑n
i=1 si,j wins. We consider that ei is sincere when
she communicates her utility vector Ui as vector of marks.
2) Exhaustive Ballot (EB): The protocol proceeds through
a series of m − 1 elimination rounds. At the beginning of
each round, each elector communicates her preferred candidate
among the remaining ones, the candidate with least votes is
eliminated. The winner is the last remaining candidate.
3) Instant Runoff Voting (IRV): Each elector communicates
her order of preferences once and for all. Then, the protocol
emulates a series of m− 1 elimination rounds. In each round,
the candidate who is ranked first by the least number of
electors is eliminated and each ballot in her favor is transferred
automatically to the best ranked remaining candidate.
It is straightforward that IRV is indeed an emulation of EB.
In particular, if all electors vote sincerely, both systems give
the same result. The main difference is that in EB, an elector
can contradict herself from one round to another, like changing
the candidate she says she prefers between two rounds even
if she has not been eliminated.
D. Manipulability criteria
We need properties that describe the manipulability of
voting systems by tactical voting. We consider a given set
of electors, candidates, utilities, and a voting system with an
associated sincerity function. v ∈ C denotes the candidate
who is elected when all electors vote sincerely. The following
definitions hold.
1) Coalition manipulability (CM): A subset of electors,
by casting insincere ballots, can make the result of the vote
strictly better from their point of view. That is, there exists a
challenging candidate c ∈ C\{v} such that the electors strictly
preferring c to v can cast their ballots so that c gets elected,
assuming that other electors don’t change their own ballots.
2) Trivial coalition manipulability (TM): There is a chal-
lenging candidate c ∈ C \ {v} that gets elected if all electors
preferring c to v use their trivial strategy. An elector e uses
her trivial strategy for candidate c against candidate v when
she pretends that all candidates in C \{v, c} have a low utility
(while preserving their respective positions), that v has an even
lower utility and that c has an infinite utility. For instance, the
trivial strategy in RV consists of favoring the candidate c and
to put the other at a disadvantage. In IRV or EB, the trivial
strategy means putting c at the top and v at the bottom, while
keeping one’s sincere and personal order of preferences over
the other candidates.
CM is about being able to manipulate the system, no matter
how hard it is. It answers the question: Can the system
be manipulated by omnipotent manipulators, which have a
complete knowledge of the system and can cast coordinated
ballots? TM, on the other hand, answers the question of an
almost-zero-knowledge, decentralized, manipulation: Once the
challenger c is chosen, all electors of the coalition can cast
their own ballot independently.
E. Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
We say that an elector ei is a dictator iff, for any possible
outcome c ∈ f(S1 × . . . Sn), elector ei can cast a ballot so
that the elected candidate will be c, whatever other electors
vote. We say that a voting system is dictatorial if there is a
dictator.
It is manipulable iff there exists a situation such that at least
one single elector can benefit from casting an insincere ballot
(which implies CM).
The following theorem was proved by Satterthwaite [3] for
voting systems based on permutations and by Gibbard [2] in
the general framework of strategies:
Every non-manipulable voting system with at least three
possible outcomes is dictatorial.
III. MULTI-OPERATOR NETWORKING CASE
In this section, we define the multi-operator end-to-end path
establishment problem. We first explain how voting systems
can be applied to solve it, and how the set of candidate paths
is selected. Then we define the cost, gain and utility modeling,
which quantifies the willingness of operators to carry or not
a given path. Finally we explain how the voting systems are
applied and how the manipulability is calculated.
A. Voting systems for multi-operator path establishment
The problem to solve is the following:
In multi-operator networks, for given ingress and egress,
which end-to-end path should be selected if one takes opera-
tors’ preferences into account?
Figure 1 represents an example1 of interconnection of multi-
operator networks, with one operator network per European
country, interconnected by some geographical neighborhood.
1This example is not representative of a real multi-operator network
interconnection. For instance, such a flat interconnection topology differs from
the historical BGP hierarchical topology of Internet. Nevertheless, our goal
here is to give a simple model where costs derive from some sort of underlying
metric, so a geographical basis is a natural choice. Note that some recent
studies show an evolution towards flatter topologies ([9], [10]).ISBN 978-3-901882-53-1, 9th CNSM 2013: Workshop ICQT 2013 293
Fig. 1. Multi-operator network interconnection example
We apply the voting systems using the following modeling:
• The electors are the operators.
• The candidates are the feasible routing paths for a given
demand or a subset of them.
• The preferences of each operator is represented by a
utility vector, from which a ballot is defined (cf §II).
• The election result is the selected path for the client
request. Any voting system can be used. Here we suppose
there is a trusted and independent entity, called super-
visor, in charge of the election process. The supervisor
collects the ballots from all the operators and processes
the voting algorithm to decide the winner path (but other
options are possible: e.g., the operators cooperatively
participating to the whole voting scheme).
Some operators may have some knowledge about the utili-
ties of their competitors:
• by public knowledge about the utilities;
• by cooperation between some operators (coalition);
• by inference on previous votes (learning);
• by spying or information interception.
So the operators may use that knowledge to lie about their own
preferences, in order to improve their benefits, maybe against
the global interest. Studying the manipulability of the voting
systems is thus important in that context.
B. Candidate paths
In our study case, we consider the interconnection of n = 38
operator networks of figure 1.
A demand is a request for end-to-end connections, with
the only constraint that the connection must start at a given
operator network (ingress) and end at another one (egress).
For each demand, if one considers the whole set of possible
paths without loop, the size of that set increases exponentially
with the number of nodes in the network. So we apply the
following reasonable rule to limit the number of proposed
paths (only the interconnection topology is known):
• The supervisor fixes a minimal number of candidate paths
mmin, and an initial threshold δmin.
• It knows the link topology (but not the costs!). So it
computes the minimal number of hops hmin to satisfy
the demand.
• It takes all paths without loop with a number of hops
less than or equal to hmin+ δh, where δh is the smallest
threshold that is greater than or equal to δmin and that
selects at least mmin candidates.
It is important to note that:
• The candidate paths are fully determined by the demand
and the parameters (mmin, δmin). Their exact number
depends on the demand.
• For each candidate path cj , only a subset Ej of the
operators ei ∈ E are concerned by the candidate path.
• Among the operators, some may be concerned by only a
subset of candidates.
For numerical evaluations, we use two limitation options:
(mmin, δmin) ∈ {(5, 0); (10, 1)}. With the above rules, the
first option gives on average 9.94 candidate paths per request
(min = 5, max = 43), and the second option gives on average
21.25 paths per request (min = 10, max = 127).
C. Multi-operator cost and gain modeling
We define the utilities of each operator as the difference
between his gains and costs for each possible path. Various
cost and gain models could be defined, but the main goal of
this study is to evaluate the manipulability of voting system
in that context, so we used the following simplified ones 2:
1) Cost: The cost for an operator ei in Ej to carry the
path cj is noted αi,j . We define αi,j as the sum of half
the cost of the incoming interconnection link (null for the
ingress operator) and half the cost of the outgoing inter-
connection link (null for the egress operator). For the cost
of the interconnection link between two adjacent operators
a and b, we choose a linear function C0 + da,b/d0 of the
distance da,b between a and b (a and b being the capital
cities in our multi-network example). In our numerical study,
we considered three cost options: dominated by the constant
cost C0 (C0 = 1 and d0 = 100 × max(da,b)), purely linear
(C0 = 0, d0 = max(da,b)), and intermediate (C0 = 1,
d0 = max(da,b)/3).
2) Gain: Concerning the gain for the operators, we consider
that the client pays a fixed amount A for a given demand (flat
fare). If path cj is selected, this amount A is equally distributed
between the concerned operators ei ∈ Ej . We fixed the value
A in such a way that, when considering the least cost path for
each request, the average global revenue represents 140% of
the average global cost (i.e., benefit of 40%).
3) Utility: The sincere utility value for operator ei to carry
the candidate path cj can be defined as the net income (positive
or negative) for the operator if this candidate path is selected:
• ui,j =
A
card(Ej) − αi,j if ei ∈ Ej ,
• ui,j = 0 if ei /∈ Ej (the operator is then indifferent).
2If one would like to test more accurate cost or gain models, this is feasible.
In our opinion, they should bring only minor changes on the major trends
observed, but it may be interesting to test them in future works.ISBN 978-3-901882-53-1, 9th CNSM 2013: Workshop ICQT 2013 294
4) Global income: The global income of a given operator
depends on the distribution of the demands. In our study, we
consider that the demands are uniformly distributed among
each pair of different ingress and egress operators.
D. Voting systems for the multi-operator study case
1) RV: With the utilities previously defined, the most nat-
ural choice for a voting system is the one that maximizes the
global revenue, which is the sum of the utilities of all operators
contributing to the selected path. This corresponds exactly to
RV defined in Subsection II-C, so RV is the natural reference
system. In details:
• The operators give their utilities to the supervisor;
• The supervisor sums the marks for each candidate path,
and select the path with the maximal value.
One of the drawback with RV is that the operators are required
to give all the information about their cost to the election
supervisor. Even if it is a trusted and independent entity, they
may wish to avoid giving this kind of information.
2) IRV: Numerous other voting systems may be applied.
Previous works (see for instance [11] or [12]) suggest that
IRV belongs to the least manipulable voting systems known,
so we used IRV as the second voting system for our use case3.
Path selection with IRV works as follows:
• Each elector (operator) gives the order of preferences on
the candidate paths that pass through her network. and
if she likes it (financial gains) or dislikes it (financial
losses) in order to be able to place them relatively to the
candidate paths for which she is not concerned (forced
indifference for them).
• The supervisor processes the IRV mechanisms as defined
in Subsection II-C, with the following rule with equal
preferences: In each round of IRV, for a given operator
(elector), the vote is equally divided between the can-
didates with the highest preference. In each round, the
election supervisor eliminates the candidate path with the
least votes (the number of votes may be not an integer
value in this case). In case of ties, we choose to eliminate
the candidate path with the lowest index 4.
E. Manipulability algorithms
First, for both voting systems, the manipulation of the vote
by a operator is limited to the candidate paths concerning
this operator: The operator cannot pretend to like or dislike
a candidate path to which he must be indifferent.
1) RV: When electors preferring c to v try to make c
win, their best strategy is obviously the trivial one: Give the
maximum mark to c and the minimum mark to the other
candidates, except the marks of the paths for which they are
indifferent, which must remain unchanged. Because of that,
TM and CM are equivalent. The maximum mark is set to +A
and the minimal mark to −A in our study.
3Actually, we also tried other voting systems in experiments not presented
here, and verified that IRV was the most promising candidate with respect to
manipulability for our concerns.
4It could be done randomly, but the impact is marginal in our problem.
2) IRV: Finding out whether there is a way to manipulate
with IRV is much more difficult. In fact, the problem is known
to be NP-hard [13]. So we use simple methods that test the
manipulability (or non-manipulability) of a given demand.
When the tests are inconclusive for a given demand, we can
only answer maybe, but when considering all demands, this
allows to give lower and upper bounds for manipulability.
In order to prove that IRV is manipulable, we just try trivial
manipulation. This gives a lower bound of the manipulability.
In order to prove that IRV is not manipulable, our algorithm
is an adaptation of [14]. The idea is to use a variation of the
voting system that gives more power to manipulators and for
which CM can be exactly computed. If the altered system
cannot be manipulated, IRV cannot either. In details:
• At each round, we authorize the manipulators to change
their vote. This shifts the voting paradigm from IRV to
EB. The interest is that eliminating candidate a then b
or b then a lead to the same situation, whatever the
manipulators have done to get there. This permits an
iterative approach instead of a recursive one.
• At each round, each manipulator can share her vote
between several candidates, even non equally, for instance
1
3 vote for one candidate and
2
3 vote for another one. This
allows a water-filling approach and avoid Knapsack-like
issues.
• We authorize electors to lie even about the paths they
don’t belong to. So all manipulators are symmetric in
right and we don’t have to manage them individually.
With these modifications, we can manage the group of ma-
nipulators globally: At each round, we can divide their votes
as we like between the candidates, in order to eliminate the
candidate we want to.
When manipulation is impossible with these adapted rules,
it is also impossible with the rules given in III-D: This provides
an upper bound for IRV manipulability.
As we will see in next section, lower and upper bounds
tend to be close to each other, so we get a good estimate of
manipulability.
Remark: Actually, the previous algorithm is still very
costly (virtually in 2m, where m is the number of candidates).
When there are more than 25 candidates and that trivial manip-
ulation does not work, we don’t try to prove the impossibility
and we directly consider the test inconclusive.
IV. MULTI-OPERATOR NETWORKING RESULTS
In this section, we analyze the results we obtained on the
multi-operator network case described in Section III.
For both RV and IRV, we first zoom on one specific scenario
that will serve as reference, and then we extend the results for
several parameters. We observe manipulability and economic
efficiency, with sincere and insincere ballots.
A. Reference scenario
Our reference scenario is the case with (mmin, δmin) =
(5, 0) (on average 9.94 candidate paths per demand) and the
intermediate link cost model (C0 = 1, d0 = max(da,b)/3).
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Voting system RV IRV
Sincere efficiency 100% 95 %
Manipulability 96% < 20% (TM: 18%)
Insincere efficiency (average) 37% 90%
Insincere efficiency (worst case) -75% 89%
TABLE I
MAIN RESULTS FOR THE REFERENCE SCENARIO
((mmin, δmin) = (5, 0), (C0, d0) = (1,max(da,b)/3) )
• Sincere efficiency: global net income, in percentage of the
optimal global net income that assumes sincere voting for
all operators.
• Manipulability: proportion of the demands that are CM.
For range voting, this can be exactly computed because
CM is TM. For IRV, we use TM as a lower bound and
the EB variant to give an upper bound (cf §III-E).
• Insincere efficiency: efficiency of the system when manip-
ulations are allowed. For a given demand, several manip-
ulations can occur. We can measure the average insincere
efficiency, if one manipulation is selected at random, or
the worst case situation if for each manipulable demand,
one chooses the manipulation that minimizes the global
net income (remember that by definition, the net income
of the manipulators will be increased, though).
The results are presented in Table I. IRV presents many
advantages over the more natural RV selection:
• For sincere voting, i.e., with no manipulation, RV gives
the economic optimum as expected. While not having
global optimum as a target, IRV still manages to achieve
about 95% of the optimum. This slight efficiency decrease
can be seen as the price to pay for robustness (see below).
• Almost all demands (96%) can be manipulated if ranged
voting is used, against less than 20% for IRV.
• Considering the impact on efficiency, the degradation is
very high for RV: It becomes only 37% of the optimum
on average, down to -75% in the worst case scenario. On
the other hand, IRV maintains a robust 90% on average
(89% in the worst case scenario).
So one should retain that IRV is much less subject to manip-
ulation than range voting, and that even when a manipulation
exists, its impact on the global welfare is bearable.
B. Impact of parameters
We proposed in Section III two path-limitation parameters
and three cost models, so we have six possible configurations.
Results for these six configurations follow.
1) Manipulability: Figure 2 indicates the manipulability of
the considered scenarios.
For both voting systems, the most numerous the path can-
didates are, the most manipulable they are. This is somehow
expected, as more candidates mean more possible challengers
for manipulation. So the supervisor should limit the number
of proposed candidates to decrease the manipulability, while
keeping enough candidates to allow a fair path selection.
Concerning the link cost model, we observe that the flatter
it is, the lower the manipulability (for both voting systems).
But the most interesting result is that the manipulability of IRV
stays much lower than the one of RV in all cases. While RV
Fig. 2. Manipulability of IRV vs. Range Voting
Fig. 3. Efficiency of IRV vs. Range Voting for sincere preferences
manipulation is always higher than 85%, IRV manipulation is
about 30% or less except for one scenario (between 40% and
48% for the highest number of candidate paths with purely
linear link cost model).
Note that for IRV, the lower and upper bounds for manip-
ulability are relatively close. The differences are higher when
the number of candidate paths increases, but this is due to the
way we calculate the upper-bound (see Section III), skipping
the evaluation for demands with too many candidate paths.
2) Sincere economic efficiency: Figure 3 gives the sincere
efficiency of each voting system for the considered scenarios.
By definition, RV gives 100% economic efficiency. But IRV
gives an economic efficiency close to this optimum. For both
low or high number of candidate paths, this efficiency is
about 80% for purely linear link cost model, about 95% for
intermediate link cost model, and more than 99% for constant
link cost model. This confirms that, even if IRV may give a
path which is not the optimal one for global economic benefits,
the selected path is quite close to the optimal choice.
For completeness, Figure 3 also indicates the efficiency
obtained when the path is chosen at random among the
candidates, and when the worst candidate is chosen.
3) Insincere efficiency: To complete our study, Figure 4
displays the insincere efficiencies. For all scenarios, one ob-
serves a huge gain by choosing IRV instead of RV. For IRV,
the economic efficiency is only slightly degraded compared
to sincere preferences, and the worst case is never far from
the average case. For RV, the economic efficiency is largelyISBN 978-3-901882-53-1, 9th CNSM 2013: Workshop ICQT 2013 296
Fig. 4. Efficiency of IRV vs. Range Voting for manipulated preferences
degraded compared to sincere utilities: While the economic
efficiency with sincere utilities is 100%, when considering
manipulations, it falls to: about 0% on average and large
negative values on worst case for the purely linear link cost
model; about 35% on average and about 8% on worst case for
the intermediate link cost model; about 60% on average and
about 50% on worst case for the constant link cost model.
All these results confirm that IRV is really safer to preserve
the economic benefits than RV.
V. CONCLUSION
Existing theoretical results show that, except for a few
degenerated cases, any non-dictatorial system is susceptible, in
some scenarios, to be manipulated, even by a single voter. In
this paper, we proposed to quantify manipulability in practical
scenarios and to measure its effects with respect to global
welfare. We focused on the use case of multi-operator end-to-
end path establishment. We compared two voting systems:
• Range Voting: RV maximizes the global net income of the
system, provided that the carriers (the voters) give their
sincere utilities on the proposed candidate paths (their
own net income).
• IRV: Based on weak order preferences with elimination
rounds, IRV has a “reputation” to be less manipulable
([11], [12]), which we were able to validate in our study.
In the end, our study highlights the interest of voting
systems in the context of Internet economic ecosystems where
many competing players are involved, with end-to-end path
selection as a practical use case.
We also observed that all voting systems are not equivalent.
When carriers cannot be trusted, IRV can largely outperform
(in our framework) the economic gain maximization that RV
is supposed to achieve:
• IRV manipulability probability can be as low as 20%
while, in the same configuration, RV is close to 100%.
• With IRV, the operators do not need to give all the
information to process the vote, the preference order with
the indifference limit is enough, while for RV, they must
give the whole information about their cost.
• Although IRV does not target the economic optimal
choice, it remains very close to it. The price of non-
manipulability is low (in the range of 5% in our study).
• With manipulations, the degradation on the economic
efficiency is limited for IRV, while it is huge for RV.
Future work
The work presented in this paper opens many opportunities
for future works:
• Analysis of the sensibility of the various parameters, other
cost and revenue models.
• Analysis of other voting systems or proposition of new
efficient voting algorithms to apply.
• Deeper theoretical analysis of manipulability in voting
systems, using a more generic framework.
• Identification of other use cases in the context of Internet,
with other kind of ecosystems.
Indeed, the framework of voting systems can be useful in
any situations in which one can identify voters that need to
decide among different options. We proved in our study case
that, by correctly choosing the voting system, one can limit the
manipulability by tactical voting of some coalition of voters
and preserve the revenue for the global economic ecosystem.
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